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I. INTRODUCTION
The economic analysis of law enjoys a long and proud tradition in the United
States (U.S.) and is firmly rooted in its legal system. The growth of the “law and
economics movement” in the American legal environment has been compared to the
release of the rabbit in Australia. “[E]conomics found a vacant niche in the ‘intellectual
ecology’ of the law and rapidly filled it.”1 Although initially confined to areas like
antitrust and regulated industries, thanks to pioneering scholarship of academic
luminaries such as Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, and Guido Calabresi, the
American law and economics movement has moved into almost every nook and cranny
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of the American legal landscape including criminal law, family law, employment
discrimination, and procedural law.2
If the success of the application of economic analysis to legal problems in the
U.S. can be compared to that of the rabbits released in Australia, the law and economics
movement in Europe might best be compared to the experience of the camels that were
released into the American southwest.3 Although the economic analysis of law has been
of some interest to European scholars, it seems curiously out of place in their work and,
so far, the discipline has not been successfully transplanted to the European academic
eco-system. Although European economists have shown a willingness to develop or
apply economic analysis to law, the European legal system has remained largely immune
to its benefits.4 Indeed, Professor Dau-Schmidt’s experience has been that the primary
interest of European legal scholars in the economic analysis of law is for use as a window
into the American legal mind, rather than for purposes of applying the same principles in
the analysis of European laws. The impact of the economic analysis of law on European
legislation and court decisions has been negligible.5 Although it appears that the
movement is currently under-appreciated in Europe, the authors believe there is
tremendous opportunity for its future application on this continent.
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This essay will examine the reasons why the economic analysis of law has not
flourished in European countries as it has in the U.S. In particular, this paper will focus
on three European countries—the United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, and France. Each
of these countries has a different culture, legal system, and legal academy, which have
led to different degrees of success in the application of economic principles in the
analysis of law.

II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN THE U.S.
The economic analysis of law has played a significant role within the U.S. legal
academy as well as in the development of the country’s legal system. The U.S. legal
academy has engaged in a dynamic interdisciplinary debate for decades; included most
prominently in that discussion is the law and economics movement. 6 Scores of articles
are written analyzing American legal doctrines and statutes from an economic
perspective.7 Proponents of the economic analysis of law hold prestigious appointments
to the federal bench, including Court of Appeals Judges Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook and Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.8 Why has
the economic analysis of law prospered in the U.S.? An examination of the American
culture, legal system, and legal academy yields many insights.
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1. THE AMERICAN CULTURE AND LEGAL SYSTEM: THE PROTECTION OF RUGGED
INDIVIDUALISM
Forged on the North American frontier, American culture is defined by the rugged
individualism and autonomy of classic Lockean liberalism. Liberalism holds that citizens
are inevitably self-interested.9 Molding the citizenry towards a common good is a waste
of time because one cannot remove self-interest, and in fact, diversity of interest
precludes anything like a common good. The goal of classic liberalism is to encourage
citizens to pursue their own views and goals.10 Liberalism also holds that individuals are
endowed with certain natural rights that are reserved by the individual in the social
contract and not dependent on the government for their legitimacy.11 This is inconsistent
with the French version of the social contract based on the work of Rousseau, which will
be discussed shortly, in which all individual rights are given up to the state and then
returned to the individual. Moreover, since our experience as a British colony,
Americans have been suspicious of big government and, therefore, strongly believe in
limited government and decentralized decision-making.
These characteristics of American culture are consistent with the economic
analysis of law. Neo-classical economic analysis is based on individual, rational
decision-making, akin to the individual decision-making revered by classic liberalism.
Moreover, the logic of neo-classical economic analysis supports decentralized decisionmaking by market participants with minimal government interference as a means of
maximizing efficiency. This logic is consistent with the American distrust of government
9
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power and our Constitutional system of protecting individual rights from government
intrusion. Accordingly, it is not surprising that legal problems of interest to Americans
are readily amenable to economic analysis.
Consistent with Lockean liberalism, individual rights in America are an integral
part of the U.S. Constitution through the Bill of Rights. The government is responsible
for protecting individual rights and, in the event these rights are infringed, the courts must
decide the limits and proper protection of these rights. As a result of Americans’
suspicion of big government, the U.S. Constitution created three separate and distinct
branches of the federal government, each enjoying relatively equal distribution of power
through a system of checks and balances. This system was established to protect
individual rights, and the states, from federal government encroachment. The judiciary
enjoys a relatively powerful role through judicial review established in Marbury v.
Madison.12
The relative strength and fluidity of the American judiciary seem to have
provided significant impetus for the growth of the economic analysis of law in the
American experience.13 Given their position of relative strength in our system of checks
and balances, American judges are allowed, perhaps even compelled, to be more creative
than their European counterparts. Even in comparison with their British common law
cousins, American judges are “considered far more adventurous.”14 Legislation to
countermand a court decision, or remedy a problem, has to clear more hurdles under the
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U.S. legal system than under European parliamentarian systems.15 Moreover, in America
it is “altogether natural for a lawyer in the course of his career to be a professor, a
practicing attorney, a judge, and even a politician …this fluidity of roles has enabled a
number of law professors identified with the movement to become consultants,
practitioners, government officials, judges, and even Supreme Court justices.”16 Some of
the movement’s best-known scholars, including Judges Richard Posner and Guido
Calabresi, have been promoted to the bench.17
America’s common law system itself is also widely believed to have helped spur
the law and economics movement. It is presumed that a common law system is more
efficient that a civil law system because “the common law [is] designed to give effect to
private bargains with minimum active interference from the state…and common law
rules tend to become precedential only to the extent that they are efficient…more
efficient rules are upheld while less efficient ones are overruled.”18 Moreover, the role of
the judge in the common law system is more extensive than that in a civil law system.
Under a common law system, judges interpret statutes and the Constitution while
“discovering” the common law that prevails in the absence of relevant legislation. Under
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a civil law system the judge is merely the “mouth piece for the law” interpreting the legal
rights and relationships that are established by the legislature in the code.19

2. THE AMERICAN LEGAL ACADEMY
The American legal academy combines student graduate study with a
professionally trained professorate in a way that provides little cover for an entrenched
philosophy of legal discipline. In the U.S., students typically undertake study for a threeyear graduate legal degree (J.D.) after they have already successfully completed a fouryear undergraduate degree. Traditionally, American law school professors had no
education beyond the same three-year graduate degree conferred upon all attorneys and
were drawn from legal practice. This practice is changing, in no small part due to the
success of the law and economics movement.20 However, at the time of the rise of the
law and economics movement in the U.S. during the 1960’s and 70’s, the American
academy combined a relatively well-educated student body that had been exposed to a
variety of academic disciplines with a faculty with a relatively small investment in any
particular academic perspective or school of thought. This combination provided a fertile
ground for the spread of economic analysis in the American academy in that it provided
both students who had the undergraduate preparation for instruction in such theory and a
professorate who were not overly wedded to existing legal philosophy.
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Further undermining the entrenchment of the academic status quo in the U.S. is
the fact that American legal scholarship is published in an exceedingly large number of
primarily student-edited journals. Because the vast majority of U.S. journals are studentedited, legal scholars do not need to convince a fellow professor, steeped in the
arguments of the prevailing legal discipline, that an article is important in order to get it
published. Only student editors need be convinced. Articles in student-edited journals
are published not because they fall into the traditional legal discipline but because they
are interesting, novel, or controversial. Accordingly, it is relatively easy for new and
novel ideas from a variety of disciplines to find their way into the American legal
literature.
Finally, just prior to the rise of the law and economics movement in the U.S., the
American legal academy experienced a void in legal theory. During the middle of the
twentieth century, the logic of legal formalism gave way to the empirical demands of
legal realism in the United States. 21 Rather than divining the inherent logic of the law
from disparate appellate opinions, the American legal academy became increasingly
concerned with documenting the reality of the law in practice. At the same time,
scholarship in philosophy undermined the traditional normative underpinnings of
American legal thought.22 This decline in formalism and traditional normative theory
created an opportunity for the rise of the economic analysis of law in the American legal
21
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academy.23 Not only was the structure of the American legal academy amenable to
change, but the American legal academy needed to borrow from economics and other
disciplines to fill the gaps in its own disciplinary perspective. Among all of the
disciplines that the law has borrowed from, economics is the most important. “The
moving force of this change is not all of the ‘law and’ developments of the last twenty
years but one particularly—law and economics.”24

3. WHY THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW HAS SUCCEEDED IN THE U.S.
The American cultural and legal landscapes have proven extremely fertile ground
for the law and economics movement. The neo-classical model of individual rational
decision-making through decentralized markets strikes a harmonious cord with American
individualism and our distrust of centralized government power. Moreover, our system
of governmental checks and balances and common law adjudication makes for a
relatively strong and adventuresome judiciary that is more likely to be subject to
evolutionary pressure towards efficient legal rules or to decide cases on the basis of
public policy. Finally, the history and structure of our legal academy allows for a wideopen scholarly debate that incorporates facets from many disciplines. Thus, it is not
surprising that the careers of the greatest theorists in the law and economics movement,
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including Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, and Judge Posner, have been undertaken in the
United States.

III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN EUROPE
Although Europeans are curious about the law and economics movement, its
impact on their legal environment has been comparatively slight, especially in the civil
law countries. Few European universities offer classes strictly devoted to the study of
law and economics.25 Additionally, the study of law and economics is not generally
incorporated into traditional law courses.26 Articles employing the economic analysis of
law are relatively rare in the European academy and there is only one European journal
dedicated solely to the economic analysis of law. 27 Economic analysis is fairly
uncommon in European cases outside its traditional stronghold of antitrust, and there are
no comparable judicial appointments of law and economics scholars to the bench as there
has been in the U.S. Of the three countries profiled in this paper, law and economics has
been most successful in England and least successful in France. An examination of the
cultures, legal systems, and legal academies of these various countries, in comparison
with our analysis of the U.S., will yield insight into this observation.

1. EUROPEAN CULTURE AND LEGAL SYSTEMS: CULTURED COLLECTIVISM
a) The United Kingdom: A Proud Tradition of Collective Laissez-Faire
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The British have a strong class hierarchy. Unlike in the U.S. where wealth and
social stature can be attained through individual achievement, wealth and social stature in
England are traditionally determined at birth.28 Class organization is strong among, but
not between, the classes. The organized working class has little trust in the upper class,
which includes much of the British legislature and judiciary.29
The British are more invested in history and tradition than Americans, even
though both countries follow the common law system. Unlike the U.S., England has no
written constitution. The British constitution is not the outcome of a revolution as in
France and the U.S. Instead, it is an historical constitution to which only gradual, inchby-inch, changes are made over centuries. The British have always looked to their
inheritable past and time-honored traditions to determine the scope of their laws.30
Parliamentary sovereignty reigns in the U.K. Parliament is comprised of a
compound body made up of the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons.31 There is nothing
above parliament. Parliamentary sovereignty has facilitated a strong legislature at the
expense of the executive and judiciary, and consequently, even though the British have a
common law system, the judges have only a limited role in the interpretation of the law.

b) Germany: Human Rights in a Well-Ordered System of Co-Determination
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Due to their experience in World War II, modern Germans place the utmost
importance on human rights and collective cooperation. German law values people as
humans rather than commodities. Moreover, the Germans have organized their society in
a way that allows for the state mediation of interests among groups. For instance,
Germany regulates its industrial relations system to encourage nation-wide collective
bargaining between labor and management in and environment of cooperative
consultation and exchanges of information.32 The net result is a more cooperative and
productive system of industrial relations, with fewer work stoppages than in the U.S. and
the U.K.33
While Germany does have a separation of powers doctrine, historic events have
modified this doctrine to grant more power to the legislature, at the expense of the
executive and the judiciary. Although the German judiciary is independent, its discretion
is generally limited to the interpretation of the civil code enacted by the legislature.34
“The German law courts tend to stay within the boundaries of traditional legal reasoning
to keep their factual autonomy vis-à-vis the legislature.”35 Like the British, German
judges avoid bringing external value judgments into the decision-making because of the
ease in which the German legislature can overturn a judge-made legal rule.36
Not only does the threat of the loss of autonomy limit the role of German judges
but the nature of a civil law system also narrows judicial discretion. Under a common
law system, the “judge is somehow expected to judge” whereas in civil law systems, the
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code is expected “to have already judged.”37 Civil law “judges are not to be the
cheerleaders for capitalism” but, instead, they should passively and mechanically enforce
the law without regard to the wealth or social class of the parties.38 Values of fairness
and equity tend to be more important under civil law systems than the efficiency that
often influences U.S. common law decisions.39

c) France: “Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité!” dans une Société de Confrontation et de
Conflit
The effect of the French Revolution was to overthrow the class-based system and
to create national sovereignty.40 Unlike England, the French cultural and legal landscape
is not predicated on class. The French do not focus on individual self-interest but rather
the common good of society. “[L]aws are supposed to primarily organize relationship
among people in order to avoid negative externalities and to ensure public order.”41
The French cultural and legal landscape has been shaped by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s theory of social contract.42 Under the social contract, all people form an
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association by giving to this community all of their individual rights. None are reserved
to the individual. In return, the community provides order and gives back these rights to
its citizens guaranteeing the rights in the social contract. The community defends and
protects the people and their goods. 43 The sovereign, in this case the nation, creates an
ordering system to determine what is right for the common good of the community.44
Because law is an expression of the general will, it is not subject to judicial review. It is
the law that decides the division of rights and not the courts.
France, like Germany, is also a civil law system. Common law was shunned
because it was “identified with the losing side” of the French Revolution.45 Judges were
viewed with suspicion because they had upheld the class-based ancient régime by
regularly overruling bourgeois reforms. The revolutionaries “wanted to uproot
‘medieval’ practices and replace them with ‘rational’ ones. The revolutionaries
proclaimed that law derived its authority from the popular will as expressed through
legislators, not from social norms as found by judges.”46

2. THE EUROPEAN ACADEMY
In general European legal education combines undergraduate study for students
with extensive academic preparation for the professorate.

In France and Germany, a

law diploma is an undergraduate degree taught by highly professional scholars with
graduate degrees beyond the regular law degree. Although the traditional method of legal
education in the U.K. is by reading for the bar, recently the British have adopted legal
43
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education through formal undergraduate education at degree granting institutions.
European law professors, on the other hand, undergo not only years of undergraduate
study, but also years of practicum and graduate study, emerging from the end of a long
process with degrees and training that would be the American equivalent of a Ph.D. in
law. As a result, in comparison with their American colleagues, European law professors
teach students who have less preparation in other disciplines and European professors are
more heavily invested in existing legal scholarship.
Institutional features of the European academy further entrench disciplinary
practices and ideals. Publication by European legal scholars is mostly in faculty-edited
books or journals. There are fewer European journals overall and only one European
journal dedicated solely to the economic analysis of law.47 Very few of the general
journals publish articles by law and economic scholars.48 Tenure, at least in France, is
granted on a national, rather than an institutional, basis. Review is undertaken through a
unitary national process and review committee. As a result, new approaches in the
analysis of law must receive approval from scholars invested in the existing body of
scholarship before they can be published or gain the author tenure.
Finally, formalism did not suffer the same precipitous decline in Europe that it did
in the U.S. The European conception of “legal science” consists of a massive body of
legal scholarship that can trace its roots all the way back to Roman law and which is
considered such an important backdrop for the drafting of modern legal codes that all
legal arguments generally start, and finish, with this body of accumulated wisdom.49
Although the legal realist movement made a strong challenge to formalism in Germany in
47

Posner, supra note 6, at 66.
Henne, supra note 25, at 226, n.84.
49
Mathias Reiman, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV. 837(1990).
48

15

the 1920’s and 30’s, the movement became associated with the Nazi regime and
accordingly suffered a disadvantage in its consideration by modern European legal
theorists. 50 European scholars of course recognize that strict formalism is not a
completely accurate view of the development of law, but because this school of thought
did not suffer the same precipitous decline it suffered in America, there has been no
similar void in the discipline of law for the law and economics movement to fill.
European legal academic institutions are less open to change because the law is already
an established discipline and scholars are not necessarily looking to supplement it with
other disciplines. Accordingly, in Europe, the discipline of law has suffered less of a
crisis of confidence, and there has been less need for legal theorists to borrow from other
disciplines, including economics.

3. WHY EUROPE HAS NOT BEEN FERTILE GROUND FOR THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW
The relative lack of success of the economic analysis of law in Europe to date can
be traced to characteristics of European culture, legal systems, and the European legal
academy.
In general European culture is more communitarian and steeped in history and
tradition than American culture. European society is more state-oriented and less trusting
of the market.51 These aspects of European culture often make analysis of legal problems
from the perspective of individual rational actors more curious from a European
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perspective. British culture organizes its society and law more around the traditional
interaction of social groups than rational individual action. For example, for years the
British tolerated one of the most inefficient industrial relations systems in the
industrialized world, based on work days lost to industrial strife, due to their acceptance
of a tradition of class conflict through industrial strife.52 Similarly, the Germans’
commitment to human rights causes them to disdain express discussions of the value of
human life and the efficient level of medical care or regulation.53 However, perhaps the
French pose the best example of a communitarian society with their commitment to
national sovereignty and the social contract as envisioned by Rousseau. The French
conception that the nation state adopts a system of ordering and law is inconsistent with
the assumptions of the normative equality among all activities and the valuation of
entitlements based on willingness to pay implicit in the simple neoclassical economic
model.54 Moreover, the French do not focus on individual exchange and efficiency but
rather on fairness and equity. “The rationality of the economic agent who is perfectly
aware of prices, and operates calculated choices in order to maximize his pleasure at the
least cost, is a disconcerting model for one who searches solutions in equity and not in
utility.”55
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European legal systems also are less amenable to the economic analysis of law
than the American system. The European parliamentary systems allocate power more to
the legislature, and less to the judiciary, than the American system. Under British
parliamentary sovereignty, the word of parliament is supreme. Similarly, Germany’s
separation of power doctrine allocates power to the legislature at the expense of the
judiciary. Although the German judiciary is independent, it is very careful not to “invoke
external values or consideration of public policy” and risk losing its autonomy.56 As a
result, the use of social sciences has met with great resistance when such arguments have
been raised in legal interpretation.57 French judges also have a limited role in creating
new law. Like their German counterparts, French judges are ostensibly only to interpret
the law because the law, as written by the nation, has already judged.58 Express policybased arguments, like those used in economic analysis, are generally not welcomed.
The European civil law systems generally provide a more limited role for judges.
“Civil law reasoning typically starts from abstract premises and concepts and, therefore,
gives little room to the kind of consequentialist, forward-looking reasoning on which law
and economics relies.”59 Although European scholars recognize that in reality even
merely “reading” a statute can involve important policy decisions, the rhetoric of
European legal practice in the civil systems is that all of the policy decisions have already
been addressed by the legislature.60 Even though the British have a common law system
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that is the precursor of our own, the role of the judges is more limited in the British
system. Because of parliamentary sovereignty, judges are less likely to be adventurous
and stray too much from the time-honored traditions.61 They tend to rely more on the
doctrine of stare decisis than even their American common law counterparts, which has
the effect of leaving little roomfor policy analysis. 62
Moreover, the relationship of the judiciary to practitioners and academics in
Europe, and the lack of fluidity among these three forms of practice, may also contribute
to the slow growth of the law and economics movement in Europe. The British legal
profession “‘has been notoriously unwilling to admit the relevance of social science’”
into the discipline.63 “The English legal fraternity is wary of theory, contemptuous of
experts and academics, and reluctant to accept the idea that other disciplines have
something valuable to say about ‘law.’”64 In Germany, the legal academy is under the
influence of the judiciary.65 The judiciary’s cautionary relationship with social sciences
has prevented economic analysis from becoming an integral part of the German legal
academy.66 Lastly, a European legal scholar is unlikely to move from professor to
practicing attorney to judge and to legislator. In Germany and France, for instance, the
judiciary is a separate profession. “The isolation and the relative political impotence of
European judiciaries have contributed to their formalist approach, in which law is
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conceived of as a technical, autonomous discipline sealed off from other fields, such as
economics.”67
Finally, the structure of the European legal academy has been less amenable to the
growth of the law and economics movement in Europe. The Europeans are heavily
invested in law as an autonomous discipline and are quite happy with the academic
product they produce. Although there is certainly interest in inter-disciplinary research,
the Europeans perceive no intellectual void or disciplinary crisis of confidence that they
must fill with the economic analysis of law. Moreover, the European systems of
publication in faculty-edited journals and national tenure help to reinforce the entrenched
academic establishment. In order for new methods of analysis to make it into European
scholarship, they have to gain at least some acceptance by academics that have built their
careers on the status quo.

IV. THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPE
Although the economic analysis of law may never be as important to Europeans
as it is to Americans, it undoubtedly has applicability to European legal problems and
potential to grow in its importance. No civil code is without its flaws. Scholars have
long known that “the official and perfectly formalist conception of passive adjudication
on the basis of the unproblematic application of the Codes’ grammar is...no
longer...tenable.”68 Civil law judges often have to fill these holes in the code with policybased rules, although this process is often hidden from public view. Moreover, civil law
systems are increasingly relying on case law as well as statutes and regulations outside of

67
68

Posner, supra note 2, at 5.
de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, supra note 37, at 488.

20

the code to resolve disputes.69 Economic analysis can be a valuable tool in making such
decisions.
If law and economics is to be successfully implemented in European countries,
especially in those where the judiciary is not on equal footing with the legislature, then
the economic analysis of law must permeate not only the legislature but also judicial
interpretation. Although it is true that even civil law judges inevitably make policy
decisions in reading the code and deciding cases, within the European legal environment
arguments that present express policy considerations are more appropriately made to the
legislature. If economic analysis of law is openly considered and applied by the
legislature, then these arguments will become important to European judges and
academics.
The economic analysis of law may also become more important to Europeans as
the European Union continues extend its regulatory coverage. As European countries
continue to work together within the Union, they will need a common language to unite
their regulatory efforts and objectives. Although the language of the law may differ
among European countries, the language of economics is universal.70 Moreover,
although its structures were crafted in light of the more state-centered political systems of
Europe, the European Union was founded on the idea of liberalizing markets among the
member states and has been supported by pro-market scholars.71 Given its foundations in
market theory, it will be difficult for the European legal community to ignore the success
of law and economics in analyzing the legal problems posed by the European Union.
69
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The economic analysis of law may also enjoy more success in Europe as
alternatives such as behavioral law and economics and socio-economics become more
important in the law and economics movement.72 These alternatives to traditional
neoclassical economic analysis consider limits to human rationality and group dynamics
that may seem more realistic and appealing to European audiences. In considering the
legal questions posed by societies that are organized more around the interaction of
classes and groups in society, Europeans may find the analysis of socio-economics more
compelling. Even Americans are now being drawn to these less traditional economic
analyses in examining legal questions.73
While Europe currently lags significantly behind the U.S. in the economic
analysis of law, it is possible for this gap to be quickly reduced. The success of the
European Union may create the opportunity for economic analysis to succeed first with
the European legislatures and then with the judiciary and academy. If the desire is there,
the talented and highly skilled European academy can quickly assimilate this method of
analysis. Moreover, because European judges are generally recruited directly from law
school, if the legal academy develops a program of study in which economic principles
were consistently taught, these concepts will quickly enter the European judiciary. 74
Although the law and economics movement in Europe currently suffers a fate similar to
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that of feral camels of the American Southwest, perhaps now that the camel’s nose is
under the tent, we’ll soon see the more of this homely, yet useful, animal.
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